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In The Mariosa, [1896] P. 273, the defendants' steamship,
three days out from Montreal for Liverpool, stranded on the
coast of Labrador. The master landed the pasAdmiralty,
Life Salvage, sengers and crew, provided them with food and
Authority of accommodation, and the same day intercepted a
Manster

passing steamer which, at the request of the
master, conveyed the passengers to their destination. The
following day a steamer, passing in the opposite direction, at
the like request, took off the greater part of the crew, conveyed them to Quebec, and, on the way, telegraphed for
assistance to be sent. The defendants' vessel became a total
loss, materials worth only 6335 being saved. The contract
with the passengers provided that the defendants should not
be liable " for loss or delay from the act of God . . . perils of'
the seas, rivers, or navigation . . . or the wrongful act of the

company's servants." The owners of the passing steamers
brought an action against the defendants for salvage, or,
in the alternative, for remuneration for services rendered at
request. The defendants tendered £200, which was refused;
but Gorell Barnes, J., ruled that the tender must be upheld, as
the passengers and crew were not in any danger, so that no.
life salvage was claimable, and as the defendants were under
no obligation to forward the passengers to their destination,
the master, in transhipping them, acted as the agent of the
passengers, not of the defendants.
The Supreme Court of Georgia has lately decided a very
interesting question, holding that while an entry in a bankBanks and
Banking,
Entry in
Bank-book,

book or "pass-book " purporting to show that the

owner of the book has credit in a bank for a specifled balance is not conclusive or binding upon the

Estoppei to

bank, yet, when a banker issued and delivered

Deny,
Misrepresentation,
Concealment

such a book containing an entry of this kind
which was ab initio false, and when, after this was
done, a third person, who had seen the book,.

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

:applied to the banker for information as to the genuineness
.and accuracy of the apparent credit, at the same time disclosing his reasons for making the inquiry, and the banker, while
extpressly declining to give in terms the information thus
sought, did, by concealing the truth, or by other means,
induce the inquirer to believe the entry in the book was true
and correct, and, in consequence of that belief, to make with
the owner of the book a contract by which the inquirer,
though exercising due care in the premises, was defrauded
and suffered a loss, the banker was, within proper limits,
liable in damages to the former on account of that loss, if,
under the special circumstances of the case, he was under an
obligation to communicate to the inquirer the exact truth of
the matter: James v. Crosthwaite, 25 S. E. Rep. 754The Supreme Court of Tennessee has recently held that
under the statute of that state, which provides that loans made
by a building association shall be made "in open
guilding
and Loan
meeting to the highest bidder," (M. & V. Code
Associations,

Premiums,
Usury

Tenn. § 175 I,) loans made at a fixed premium by
agreement between the borrowers and the associa-

tion are usurious, if in excess of the legal rate of interest :
McCauley v. Workingman's Bdg. & Loan Assn., 3 7 S. W. Rep212; Post v. Mechanics' Bdg. & Loan Assn., 37 S. W. Rep. 216.
In the latter of these cases it was further decided that, in distributing the assets of an insolvent building association, the
rights of holders of stock in a series declared through mistake
to be matured, when in fact it had not matured, in respect of the
assets of the corporation, is the same, in effect and as to
,results, as that of holders of unmatured stock who have given
notice of withdrawal. They share pro rata with other stockholders, and are not to be regarded as creditors of the association.
Holders of certificates of full-paid stock issued by a building
.and loan association, calling for payments of dividends at
regular intervals, are not creditors of the associaFull paid
Stock,
-Rights of
Holders

tion, as distinguished from its other members,
since such certificates are not promises to pay
under the law merchant ; and in case of the insol-
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vency of the association, the holders of such certificates, are
only entitled, like other members, to a share of the assets proportionate to the amount they have paid in: Towle v. American Building & Loan Assn., (Circuit Court, N. D. Illinois,)'75
Fed. Rep. 938.
In a recent case before the Supreme Court of Minnesota, it
appeared that the defendant company had issued to one D.
a mileage ticket or book, which expressly provided
Carriers,
that it was to be used only by D., "whose signaTickets,
ture appears on the last page." It also provided
Transfer,
Payment of that it was subject to the conditions named in the
Fares
contract, "and made part hereof." One of these
conditions was that the ticket was not transferable, and, if
presented by any other than the original holder, "whose
signature is hereon," the conductor would take it up, and
collect full fare. The ticket was never signed by D. The
plaintiff purchased it from a broker, and presented it in payment of his fare on one of the defendant's trains. The
conductor took it up, and refused to return it to the plaintiff,
whereupon the latter refused to pay his fare unless the conductor would return the ticket. The employes of the
defendant then attempted to remove the plaintiff from the
train, for which he brought suit to recover damages. The
trial resulted in a verdict for the defendant, and a new trial
was refused. From this the plaintiff appealed; but the order
vwas affirmed, on the grounds (i) that the plaintiff had no
right to ride on the ticket, the fact that it was not signed by
the original purchaser being immaterial, since, by accepting
the ticket, he accepted all the terms and conditions contained
therein; (2) that he had no right to refuse to pay his fare,
unless the conductor would return the ticket; (3)that even
granting that the conductor had no right to take up the ticket,
(the majority of the court being nevertheless of opinion that he
had that right,) it was the duty of the plaintiff to pay his fare
or leave the train, and then pursue his remedy against the
defendant for wrongfully withholding the ticket: Rahilly v.
St. Paul & D. Ry. Co., 68 N. W. Rep. 853.
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According to a decision of the Court of Appeal of England,
.abeneficial society, whose funds are raised by means of the
Charity,
Beneficial
Society

subscriptions, fines and forfeitures of its members,
in order to provide annuities for the widows of
its deceased members, without distinction, is a

mutual insurance society, and not a charity: Cunnack v.
..Edwards, [1896] 2 Ch. 679, reversing [1895] I Ch. 489,
1895; but in the opinion of Kekewich, J., of the Chancery
Division) such a society, whose object is to provide for the
relief of members, their widows and children, if "in disti-essed
citcumstances," and whose funds are in part raised by voluntary donations and bequests from outsiders, is within the definition of a charity, as laid down in Commissioners for Speedal
Purposes of the Income Taxv. Pemsel, [I89I] A. C. 531, 1891 ;
In re Buck, [1896] 2 Ch. 727.

The Court of Appeals of New York, in Rathbone v. Wirth,
45 N. E. Rep. 15, has affirmed the decision of the Appellate
constitutional Division of the Supreme Court in Ratbone v.
Wirth, 40 N. Y. Suppl. 535, I896,'(see 35 AM.
Law,
Eiection of

Officers,

Minority

Representation

L. REG. N. S. 642,) that the Act of New York
of 1896, c. 427, is unconstitutional. That act
created a board of four police commissioners for

the city of Albany, to be elected by the common council, and
provided that not more than two of them should belong to
the same political party; that for the purpose of such election, the members of the council attending the meeting should
constitute a quorum; that each member of the council should
be entitled to vote for not more than two commissioners; that
if a vacancy should occur in the board of police commissioners, it should be filled by appointment by the mayor, on
the written recommendation of a majority of the members of
the common council belonging to the same political party as
the commissioner whose office should become vacant, and
that no person should be eligible to the office of police commissioner unless he was a member of the political party having the highest or next highest representation in the common
.council.
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In a recent case before the Circuit Court for the District ofIndiana, Baker, Dist. J., very clearly and succinctly stated theprinciples upon which the imposition of the
Contempts,
Classification, penalty for contempt rests, as follows : "ConstrucMotive
tive contempts may be distributed into two gen-eral classes, namely: First, those wherein the contemptuous
acts primarily affect public rights or the due administration of
public justice; and, second, those which primarily affect pri-vate rights, and only remotely and incidentally affect public
rights or public justice. When the contempt consists in thefailure or refusal of the party to do or refrain from doing
something which he is ordered to do or refrain from doing
for the benefit or advantage of the opposite party, the proceeding is not criminal, but is civil, and remedial in its nature.
And in this sort of contempt the intention with which the
act was committed is immaterial, except in fixing the proper
measure of punishment. The injury suffered by the complaining party is neither increased nor diminished, nor in any
wise affected, by the state of mind towards: the court of the
party doing the forbidden act. The breach of the injunction
consists in doing or failing to do the thing commanded, and
not in the intention with which the act was done." He,
therefore, held that as the defendant had been enjoined, at the
suit ot a water company, from allowing any deleterious substance to escape from its factory, into a river, the fact that it
negligently permitted a reservoir, built by it on the bank of
the river, to break and discharge its contents into it, was a
contempt punishable by fine, or by fine and imprisonment,
though there was no wilful purpose to violate the injunction :.
Indianapolis Water Co. v. American Strawboard Co., 75 Fed.
Rep. 972.
. According to a recent decision of Vaughan Williams, J., of'
the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice of England,.
Corporations, when one person is an officer of two corporations.

Common

Officers,
imputation

Knowledge

his personal knowledge is not necessarily the-

of knowledge of both the corporations. The knowledge which he has acquired as officer of one:
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-corporation will not be imputed to the other unless he has
-some duty imposed on him to communicate his knowledge to
-the corporation sought to be affected by the notice, and some
-duty imposed on him by that company to receive the notice;
and if the common officer has been guilty of fraud, or even of.
.irregularity, the court will not draw the inference that he has
fulfilled these duties: In re HampshireLand Co., [1896] 2 Ch.
-743.
The Supreme Court of the United States has lately held
that it has no jurisdiction of a writ of error from the decision
Courts,
Jurisdiction,
Supreme
Court of the
United States

of the Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming the
judgment of a circuit court rendered in a suit to
recover damages for infringement of a copyright,
when the plaintiff claims no right under the copy-

right laws of the United States, but maintains the action
'wholly upon the right given by the common law: PressPub.
Co. v. Monroe, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40.
The Supreme Court of Kansas has partly overruled the
dictum in State v. HBaf, 4o Kans. 338, to the effect that the
CriminaIl&w, rule against the trial of an offender for another
Illegal
crime than that for which he has been extradited is
Arrest,
Jurisdiction applied "in cases of separate jurisdictions, whether
the separate jurisdictions are cities, counties, districts, states,
or foreign countries," holding that a district court of the
county where a felony has been committed has jurisdiction to
try the alleged offender, when duly bound over in' regular
process, though he was originally arrested in another county
'without warrant and forcibly brought into the county where
the crime was committed: State v. May, 46 Pac. Rep. 709.
This dictum is correct only as to the case of a regular extra-dition from a foreign country. In all other cases of surrender,
.and in all cases of kidnapping or illegal arrest, after the court
-once gets possession of the accused, it can try him for all
the crimes in the calendar: See 35 Am. L. REG. N. S. 782.
-

The Supreme Court of Tennessee recently passed upon a
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very interesting question of law, arising out of a series of
transactions which, as the court says, "are cer-Deed
To Fictitious tainly unique in character."
One Robertson, the
Person,
owner of certain real estate, executed a deed of it
to a fictitious person, and then
drew a deed of'
trust to secure bonds, signed it by that fictitious name, procured a certificate of acknowledgment, had it recorded, arid
delivered it to the grantee. The property was held under the
deed of trust by the grantee; but the purchaser at the sale,
one of the creditors of the owner of the land, becoming aware
of the irregularity of the transaction, filed a bill charging that
the deed was ineffectual to convey title, because there was no
such grantee, and that the deed of trust was ineffectual to.
convey title to the trustee, because it was a forgery. The
first contention was upheld, on the ground that a deed to a
fictitious person is void, and leaves the title in the grantor ;
but the second was rejected, and it was held that the titlepassed, and that the sale under the trust was valid: Wiel v.
Robertson, 37 S. W. Rep. 274.
The peculiar political situation'that developed this fall has.
given birth to a number of election decisions involving not
only new, but very odd and interesting points.
Elections,
Preparation of Some of the most extraordinary of these are to
Ballot
be found in a recent decision by the SupremeCourt of Michigan, Baker v. Board of Election Commissionersof Wayne County, 68 N. W. Rep. 752. The ballot law of
that state, (Laws Mich. 1895, No. 271, § ii,) provides that
the state committee of any political party shall adopt a vignnette to be painted at the top of the column of the ballot
assigned to that party as a distinctive heading thereto. The
city charter of Detroit, as amended by the Laws of 1895, No.
468, provides that no vignette shall be painted on any ballot;
that the mode of conducting state and county elections shall
be in the manner provided for the election of city officers;that the provisions of that act shall govern when applicable,.
notwithstanding the provisions of the general law, unless thelatter shall in terms be declared applicable to city elections;:
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and that it shall be the duty of the election commissioners of
the city to print the ballots for use in the said city in the
manner describcd in the act for the election of city officers.
It was contended that this act prevented the use of the vignette on the ballots in the city of Detroit, but it was held
that the provision that no vignette should be used applied
only to the ballots used for the election of city officers, and
not to those used for the state, county and congressional
officers.
The ballot act of 1895 also provides, (§ I4,) that, in
arranging the ballots, it shall be the duty of the election
Nomihating commissioners of each county to place the ticket
Conventions, of the party having the greatest number of votes
Regularity,
Fusion

within the county at the last preceding election
first in the ballot, the other tickets to follow in the regular
order of their numerical strength at that election. This
provision was held mandatory, and under it, the second place
on the ticket belonged to the Democratic party. But it happened that the regularly called Democratic state convention
met on the same day and in the same city as the People's
party and the Union Silver party. The three conventions
entered into an arrangement by which they met as one body,
and nominated a fusion ticket, which it was agreed should be
called the "Democratic People's Union Silver Ticket," and
they also adopted a new and distinctive vignette. In this
joint convention, the People's party and the Union Silver
party were together accorded the same number of votes as the
Democratic party. The chairman of the Democratic state
central committee applied for a mandamus to compel the
election commissioners to place the ticket so nominated second
on the ballot, in the place belonging to the Democratic party;
but this was refused, on the ground that that ticket was not
the Democratic ticket.
After the nomination of this fusion ticket, a mass meeting
composed wholly of Democrats was held, at which presidential
electors and candidates for state officers were placed in nomination as a Democratic ticket. This mass meeting was not
called or held under the auspices of any previous state organi-
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zation; and the ticket nominated thereat was also refused the
second place on the ballot, on the ground that it could not be
-considered the regular Democratic ticket.
The Supreme Court of Montana has also had before it
some very interesting election cases. In one of these, a canNominations, didate for district judge was nominated by a certiCertificate of ficate signed and filed by the electors of the Silver
Electors,

Nomination
by Committee,
Independent
Candidate

Republican party in the counties composing the
district. The certificate of nomination was filed

under the direction of the state and county central committees of the district, and it was sought to place the
nominee's name on the official ballot under the head of the
Silver Republican party. The relator sued out a writ of
injunction to restrain the clerk from so doing, and this writ
was made permanent, on the authority of State v. Rotwitt,
(Mont.) 46 Pac. Rep. 370, 35 AM. L. REG. N. S. 779, the
court holding (I) That the direction of the central committees did not make the nomination a party action, so as to
take it out of the rule that a nomination of a regular existing
party cannot be made by a certificate of electors; and (2)
That such a nominee could not be placed on the ballot as an
independent candidate, since it was apparent that the electors
who signed the certificate of nomination intended to nominate
him as a Silver Republican, and it would not be presumed
that they would have signed a certificate to nominate him as
an independent candidate: State v. Reek, 46 Pac. Rep. 438
State v. Rotwitt was also followed in State v. Tooker, (Mont.)
46 Pac. Rep. 530.
The same court, following the rule already announced in
several states: People v. District Court, 18 Colo. 26, 1892;
Shields v. facobs, 88 Mich. 164, I89I ; State v.
Rival
Conventions Allen, (Neb.) 62 N. W. Rep. 35, 1894; Plelps v.
Pipe, (Neb.) 67 N. W. Rep. 755, 1896 ; has decided that it
is not the duty of the courts to determine which of two rival
conventions, held by opposing factions of the same political
party, and each composed of delegates regularly elected to a
.convention called by the constituted authorities of the party,
is entitled to represent the party, by enjoining the county
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clerk from placing the names of the nominees of either con-vention on the official ballot: State v. Johnson, 46 Pac. Rep.
44o. It also refused to decide which of two rival conven-tions, each claiming to be the only regular one of the party,
was such in fact, on the' ground that the relator had delayed
so long that the court could not decide the question beforethe time when, by law, the official ballot must be printed:.
State v. Reek, 46 Pac. Rep. 442.
This court further holds that a certificate filed with thecounty clerk, purporting to certify to the nomination of the
persons named therein by the county central committee of a
party, no convention of which had ever delegated such power
to a committee, does not entitle the alleged candidates to a.
place on the official ballot: State v. Tooker, 46 Pac. Rep..
530; and has passed upon two important cases involving thevalidity of a nominating convention. In the first of these,.
State v. Tooker, supra, a suit to enjoin the county clerk from
placing on the official ballot the names of certain persons as,
candidates of the Silver Republican party, under authority of.
a certificate of nomination purporting to come from a county
convention of said party, it appeared that the alleged candidates were nominated at a mneeting participated in by less than,
fifty members of the " Silver Republican Club," which had
some four hundred members; that most of the persons nom-inated at this meeting were not Silver Republicans, but men
who had already been nominated by various other parties;:
that no primaries were held, no delegates chosen, no call for
a convention made, nor any notice thereof given, other than information of the club's proceedings, published in a daily paper
as news items, and a statement on a banner that the club met.
every Wednesday night; and that the chairman who presided
at the meeting and signed the certificate of nomination did not.
know till after it was filed that the meeting was a convention,
but supposed it was merely a meeting of the club. Underthese circumstances, it was held that the meeting was not a
party convention, within § I3IO of the Political Code of.Montana, defining a convention as "an organized assemblage:
of electors or delegates representing a political party or prin--
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.ciple," and authorizing such a convention to nominate candidates for public office; and that the names on the certificate
were consequently not entitled to a place on the official ballot.
In the other case, State v. Johnson,46 Pac. Rep. 533, electors
who had assembled by personal invitation, and who represented
but one-fourth of the precincts in one county, organized as a
political party by the election of a chairman and secretary,
and the appointment of committees. The assembly then proceeded as a county convention, and nominated a county
ticket. The county convention adjourned sine die, and the
same electors immediately proceeded to hold a state convention. No call for a state convention was ever given; no
delegates to the state convention were ever elected by any
-county convention; no credentials as such were ever given;
no notice was attempted to be published of a state gathering
of the new party; and no delegates other than those who
first assembled, and who sat as a county convention, took
part in the proceedings. Upon these facts it was held there
had been neither a county nor a state convention with authority to nominate candidates, and the latter were refused a place
on the official ballot.
The Supreme Court of California holds that when the last
Certificate of day on which a certificate of nomination can be
Nomination,
Filing,
Legal Holiday

filed falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, it must, in

order to be in time, be filed the day before: Gtiffin
v. Dingley, 46 Pac. Rep. 457.
According to the Supreme Court of Kansas, after the hearing and decision of objections to a nomination certificate filed
Printing of
Ballot,
Duty of Secretary of

State

by the proper authority, the further duties of the
secretary of state are ministerial only. He has no

right to challenge, and the courts have no authority to consider, the motives that may have actuated

the nominating convention, and he should certify any proper
and requisite matter duly appearing on the nomination certificate : Breidenthalv. Edwards, 46 Pac. Rep. 469.
It was decided in the same case, that a vice-presidential
candidate, whose name, together with that of his associate
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presidential candidate, has been certified by authority of a state convention of his party as an
addition to the party appellation, and who has not declined
the national nomination, nor withdrawn as a candidate in the
state, has no right to forbid such use of his name on the
electoral ticket nominated by his party in the state, under the
section of the ballot law which provides that "any person
whose name has been presented as a candidate may cause his
name to be withdrawn from nomination by his request in
writing," etc.
Withdrawal

of Candidate

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has recently
held, in accordance with the universal current of decision,
Injunctions, (unaffected by the objurgations of well-meaning
Conspiracy to but impractical theorists,) that a continuing injury
Injure
Business,

Patrolling

to property or business may be enjoined, though
it be also punishable as a crime; and that conse-

quently the maintenance of a patrol of two men in front of
the plaintiff's premises, in furtherance of a conspiracy to prevent, whether by threats and intimidation, or by persuasion
and social pressure, any workmen from entering into, or continuing in his employment, will be enjoined, though such
workmen are not under contract to work for the plaintiff:
Vegelaln v. Guntner, 44 N. E. Rep. 1077. Field, C. J., and
Holmes, J., dissented.
When a life insurance policy is assigned, payable to the
assignee, "as interest may appear," in consideration of his
Life Insurance, real promise to support the assignor, and to
-Assignmentof receive from the proceeds of the policy such
Policy,
Bill to
Redeem

sums as he might advance for that purpose, the
assignor may maintain a bill to redeem the policy,

on the failure of the assignee to comply with his agreement,
and on repayment of the sums advanced, though the policy
has meanwhile been assigned to a third person without qualification: Boldeber v. Waelden, (Court of Appeals of New
York,) 44 N. E. Rep. lO41, reversing 3o N. Y. Suppl. 312.
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The House of Lords has recently decided, affirming Eh-betts v. Conquest, [1895] 2 Ch. 377, 1895, that when a lease
Landlord and contains covenants to keep the demised premises-.
Tenant,
in repair and to deliver them up in good repair,.
Lease,
Sub-lease,
Covenant to
Repair,
Damages

and a sub-lease is granted containing similar
covenants, with notice to the sub-lessee of the

original lease, and the lessee brings suit against.
the sub-lessee for breach of his covenant to keep in repair, it
is proper, in assessing the damages, to take into account the
liability of the lessee upon the covenants in the original lease:.
Conquest v. Booth, [1896] A. C. 490.

A prosecuting attorney is a judicial officer, and thereforenot liable in an action for libel for reading in court an indictment in which he has maliciously included as a
Libel,
Prosecuting co-defendant one against whom no evidence was
produced before the grand jury, and against whom.
Attorney
no bill was in fact found: Grzffith v. Slinkard, (Supreme
Court of Indiana,) 44 N. E. Rep. iooi.

In the case last cited, it was further held, that, since the rule:
which protects judicial officers from liability for malicious acts
done in the discharge of their judicial functions
Malicious
Prosecution, extends also to quasi-judicial officers, the members
Judicial
of a grand jury which has negligently or maliOfficers,
Grand Jury, ciously returned an indictment against a person
Prosecuting
Attorney

without evidence of probable cause are not liable
to that person in an action for malicious prosecution; and a,
prosecuting attorney is not. liable in such an action, on the
ground that he maliciously included in an indictment as a codefendant a person against whom no evidence was produced
before the grand jury and against whom no bill was in factfound: Gri2tYh v. Slinkard, (Supreme Court of Indiana,) 44
N. E. Rep. iooI.
In an action for malicious prosecution it is no defence that
the defendant submitted the case to the prosecuting attorney-
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Advice of
Prosecuting
Attorney

and acted on his advice, when it appears that all
the facts bearing on the question of probable cause
were not submitted to him: Koster v. Seney,

(Supreme Court of Iowa,) 68 N. W. Rep. 824; Peterson v.
Reisdorph, (Supreme Court of Nebraska,) 68 N. W. Rep. 943.
In Earle v. Warren Ax & Tool Co., (Supreme Judicial Court
-of Massachusetts,) 44 N. E. Rep. 1056, a contract of employment as a salesman for one year, subject to
Master and
Servant, termination before its expiration, provided that the
-Contractof
employe should receive a certain salary per
Hiring,
month, based on an estimated total value of sales
Salary
to be made by him, and subject to increase or diminution if
the gross amount of his sales during the year exceeded or fell
below the estimate. The employer terminated the contract at
the end of eight months; but in view of the fact that efforts to
sell usually in the early part of the year would not prove productive until late in the year, it was held that he was not
entitled to make any deduction from the agreed salary because
the sales made during the eight months did not amount to
two-thirds of the total estimated for the year.
The Supreme Court of Utah lately held that the law of that
.state, (Laws Utah, 1 8 96 ,p.2 19,) imposing a fine upon any one
Eight-hour who employs another to work in a mine more than
Law,
contravention of the
Constitution- eight hours a day, is not a
a deprivation of
being
not
Constitution,
Federal
ality
liberty without due process of law, nor denying to any one
-the equal protection of the laws: Holden v. Hardy, 46 Pac.
Rep. 756.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has recently
-decided, that a workman on a building, who fell and was
injured as a result of stepping on a joist that had
Negligence,
just been sawed nearly through by another workTemporary
and Transi'tory Danger

man, who had left it for a moment, could not
recover from his employer for the injury, since "it would be
impracticable to require employers to warn their men of
-every such transitory risk, when the only thing the men do
not know is the precise time when the danger will exist:
JMcCann v. Kennedy, 44 N. E. Rep. 1055.
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It would have been equally reasonable to have held that
this was a risk incident to the employment, which the workman assumed.
In his charge to the jury in the case of U. S. v. O'Brien,.
75 Fed. Rep. 900, (Circuit Court, S. D. N. Y.,) Brown, Dist.
J., laid down some very important principles with
Neutrality
Laws
regard to the construction and effect of the neutrality laws of the United States. (Rev. Stat. U. S. §§ 5282,
5286.) He charged, (i) that while these laws prohibit any
one from enlisting here as a soldier of any foreign power, and
from hiring or retaining any other persons to enlist or to go
abroad for the purpose of enlisting, they do not prohibit persons within the country, whether citizens or not, from going
to a foreign country as individuals, and enlisting there;
(2) That since it is lawful for individuals to go abroad to enlist,
they may go in any number and in any way they see fit,.
either by regular lines of steamers, by chartering a vessel, or
in any other manner, provided that they do not go as a military expedition, or set on foot within this country a military
expedition or enterprise, to be carried on from this country, orprovide or prepare the means therefor; (3) That it is nooffence, under the neutrality laws, to transport persons intending to enlist in foreign military service out of this country, and
land them in a foreign country, if they go merely as individuals, and not as a military expedition; but if the owner of a
vessel provides and furnishes her, knowing that she is to be
used to transport to a foreign country an organized body of'
men, who intend to act together in a concerted military service, and with arms, he is guilty of a violation of the law; (4)
That is no offence against the neutrality laws to transport from
this to a foreign country arms, ammunitions, and materials of'
war, either alone, or in the same ship with men who -intend
to enlist, provided they are not a part of or in aid of any
military expedition or enterprise organized in this country;
and mystery and secrecy in the preparation and conduct of'
the voyage are not conclusive of the illegality of the enterprise, but are as consistent with legality as with illegality, since-
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these precautions may be intended only to avoid attack and
capture by the foreign power against which the arms and ammunition are to be used; but (5) That if a military expedition
or enterprise has in fact been prepared in this country, and
carried by sea to a foreign shore, then all persons who
planned for it or prepared for it here, or knowingly took part
in the transportation of it, by furnishing the means therefor,
or by conducting the vessel in which it was carried, are guilty
under the laws; and (6) That it is not necessary, to constitute
a military expedition, that the men should be drilled or organized according to military tactics, as infantry, cavalry, or artillery: concert of action, combination and organization among
the men to act together; the presence of arms or weapons,
which can be used for a military putpose; and the direction
or command of a superior, are all marks of such an expedition, to be considered by the jury.
One of several sureties upon a bond conditioned that
Principland the builder shall keep the building free from
Surety,
all liens, does not, by the fact of such suretyship,
Bond against
Liens,
Effect

forfeit his right to enforce a lien as a materialman against the building: Atlantic Coast Brewing

Co. v. Donnelly, (Supreme Court of New Jersey,) 35 Atl.
Rep. 647.
A contract entered into by a public officer. (a county auditor) after the election of his successor, and but a short time
Public
before the expiration of his own term of office,
Officers,
for materials (election supplies) which will not be
Contracts,
Public Policy

needed for use until eighteen months thereafter, is
void, as against public policy: Morrison v. Board of Comrs. of
Decatur Co., (Appellate Court of Indiana,) 44 N. E. Rep.
1012, (on rehearing,) affirming 44 N. E. Rep. 6 5 .
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held in a recent
case, that a prosecution against a public officer for being conMisdemeanor cerned in public contracts may be commenced by
In Office,
the court, of its own motion, by directing the
Indictment
grand jury to investigate the matter, and by
directing the district attorney to submit an indictment, after a
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presentment by them; and that an indorsement by the grand
jury on an indictment as founded upon "presentment" is not
erroneous because not founded on their own knowledge, but
on testimony heard by them: Comm. v. Hurd,35 Atl. Rep.
682.
Under the revised statutes of Ohio, § ii, which provide
that "when an elective office becomes vacant, and is filled by
appointmEnt, such appointee shall hold the office
Vacancy,
Electi
till his successor is elected and qualified, and such
successor shall be elected at the first proper election that is
held more than thirty days after the occurrence of the
vacancy," the Supreme Court has decided that when a candidate elected to an office dies before his term begins, no
vacancy is thereby created in the office until the expiration of
the term of the existing incumbent; and if this falls within
thirty days of the next proper election, the vacancy cannot be
filled by an election thereat: State v. DaId, 45 N. E. Rep. 56.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has succeeded in so
far breaking away from the irrational "stop, look and listen"
rule, as to hold that though the fact that safety
Ralroad
Crossings,
gates at a railroad crossing, which should be
Safety Gates,

Negligence
closed in case of danger, are standing open, does
not relieve a traveller of the duty of exercising care, it is to be
considered in determining whether he exercised due care
according to the circumstances: Roberts v. Del. & H. Canal
Co., 35 Atl. Rep. 723.
This is a very important innovation upon the earlier case
of Greenwood v. P., W. & B. R. R. Co., 124 Pa. 572, 1889,
where Chief Justice Paxson deliberately ignored the fact
that the opening of the gates constitutes an invitation to
cross. In that case, he stated that " I do not understand
the law to be that when a railroad company adopts safetygates or any other appliance for the safety of the public, that
the public are thereby absolved from the duty of taking care
of themselves," which was not at all the question involved, but
a shrewd evasion of it. The real question was, whether or
not the opening of the gates was an invitation to cross, giving
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the traveler the right to expect that he would be allowed to
cross in safety; i. e., whether or not the standard of care
required of him, (for not even an absolute assurance of safety
relieves the traveler from the duty of exercising care according to the circumstances,) was not affected by that circumstance. That was the very point ruled in the present case ;
so that it may be regarded as practically overruling the
Greenwood case.
The general doctrine on this subject is, that the opening of
the gates at a crossing, and keeping them open, is an invitation to the traveler to cross, which entitles him, if in a vehicle,
to rely on the assurance of the company that he may cross
in safety, and absolves him from the duty of exercising the
amount of care required at a crossing without gates: Stapley
v. London, Brighton & South Coast Ry. Co., i L. R. Exch.
21, 1865; N.E. Ry. Co. v. Wanless, 7 L. R. H. L. 12, 1874;
Whelanv.N. Y.,L.E. & W. Ry. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 15, 1889;
Baltimore & P. R. R. Co. v. Caringlon, 3 D. C. App. 1o,
1895 ; C., St. L. & P. R. R. Co. v. Hutchinson, 120 Ill. 587,
1887; Penna. Co. v. Stegemeier, i8 Ind. 305, 1888; Indianapolis Union Ry. Co. v. Neubacher, (Ind.) 43 N. E. Rep. 576,
1896; State v. Boston & M. R. R. Co., 8o Me. 430, 1888;
Evans v. Lake Shore & ff. S. R. R. Co., 88 Mich. 442, 1891 ;
D., L. & W. R. R. Co. v. Shelton, 55 N. J. L. 342, 1893;
Glushing v. Sharp, 96 N. Y. 676, 1884; Palmer v. N. Y. Cent.
& H.R.R.R. Co., 112 N. Y. 23 4 , 1889; C., C., C. & ZRy.
Co. v. Schneider, 45 Ohio St. 678, 1888; Wilson v. N. Y, N.
H. &H. R. R. Co., i8 R. I. 491, 1894; and afortiori,the
raising of gates which have been lowered is an invitation
to cross: Conaty v. N. Y, N. E. & H. R. R. Co., 164 Mass.
572, 1895; Bond v. N. Y Cent. & H. R. R. R. Co., 69 Hun,
(N. Y.) 476, 1893; McGee v. Penna.R. R. Co., 33 W. N. C.
(Pa.) 15, 1893 ; but a foot passenger who has an unobstructed
view of the track, cannot rely absolutely upon this invitation:
Romeo v. Boston & M. R. R. Co., 87 Me. 540, 1895 ; and one
who is aware of the fact that the gates are not operated during
certain hours cannot rely on an open gate as an assurance of
safety, if he crosses the railroad during those hours : Weed v.
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N. Y. Cent.&.H.R.R.R. Co., 9 i Hun, (N.Y.) 293, 1895. Of
course, when the gates are down that fact constitutes a warning of danger to foot passengers, and it does not matter that
the gates are always down at that spot: Chicago, R. I & P.
Ry. Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 40 Ill. App. 360, 189i ; Marden v.
Boston & A. R. R. Co., 159 Mass. 393, 1893; Cleary v. P. &
R. R. R. Co., 140 Pa.

19,

189i; Mattliews v. P. & R. R. R.

Co., 16i Pa. 28, 1894; Sheehan v. P. & R. R. R. Co., i66 Pa.
354, 1895; and the lowering of the gates is also a warning,
imposing an extraordinary duty of exercising care upon a
traveler: Duvall v. Mic. Cent. R. R. Co., (Mich.) 63 N. W.
Rep. 437,

1895.

A deposit of railroad bonds under a reorganization agreement, by which new bonds are to be issued, secured by a new
mortgage on the property of the company, does
Railroad
Bonds,
not extinguish the bonds, so that the bonds of
Surrender on

Reorganiza-

tion

non-assenting holders remain as the only lien
secured by the existing mortgages: Mowry v.

Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., (Circuit Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit,) 76 Fed. Rep. 38.
It is the duty of a deputy sheriff, when specific information
is conveyed to him that a felon is at a particular place within
his jurisdiction, to take measures for his prompt
Reward,
Public
apprehension; and he cannot claim that an arrest
Officer,
Deputy

thus effected was made in his private capacity, so
as to entitle him to a reward offered by private
parties for the arrest: Witty v. Southern Pac. Co., (Circuit
Court, S. D. California,) 76 Fed. Rep. 217.
A public officer is not entitled to a reward offered for services which lie in the line of his duty; any agreement to
compensate him for doing that duty is void, as against public
policy; and his performance of the services, though according to the terms of the agreement, creates no contract between
him and the person who offers the reward. This rule has
been applied to constables, policemen, sheriffs, deputy sheriffs,
watchmen, customs officers, and overseers of the poor: R. R.
Sheriff
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v. Grafton, 51 Ark. 504, 1889; In re Russell, 51 Conn. 577,
1884; Hayden v. Souger, 56 Ind. 42, 1877; .Mfeans v. Hendershott, 24 Iowa, 78, 1867; .Aarkingv. Needy, 8 Bush, (Ky.)
22, 1871; Riley v. Grace, (Ky.) 33 S. W. Rep. 207, 1895;
Pool v. Boston, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 219, 1849 ; Davis v. Burns, 5
Allen,(Mass.)352, 1862; Wgarnerv. Grace, 14 Minn. 487, 1869;
Day v. Ins. Co., 16 Minn. 408, 1871; Exparte Gore, 57 Miss.
251, 1879; Kickv. M1ferry, 23 Mo. 72, 1856; Thornton v.
Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 42 Mo. App. 58, 189o; Gil/nore v. Lewis,
12 Ohio, 281, 1843 ; Rea v. Smith, 2 Handy, (Ohio) 193, 1856;
Smith v. WilV1din, io Pa. 39, 1848; Stamper v. Teple, 6
Humph. (Tenn.) I 13, 1845; Ring v. Devlin, 68 Wis. 384,
1887. Even a private person, who is specially deputized to
arrest a fugitive from justice, on his own application, is thereby
brought within the reason of the rule: Mlalpass v. Caldwell,
70 N. C. 130, 1874; unless the warrant was illegal, or gave
him no authority to make the arrest, in which case he can
claim the reward: Hayden v. Souger, 56 Ind. 42, 1877.
If, however, the services are without the sphere of his
official duty, so that in performing them he acts as a private
citizen, a public officer -can then claim the reward offered
therefor: England v. Davidson, ii Ad. & El. 856, 1840.
Thus, an arrest without warrant for an offence not committed
in the officer's view: Kaslingv. Morris, 71 Tex. 584, 1888;
Russell v. Stewart, 44 Vt. 170, 1872; an arrest in one state
of a fugitive from another, made by an officer of either state,
without process: Moriell v. Quarles, 35 Ala. 544, i86o;
Greggv. Pierce, 53 Barb. (N. Y.) 387, i86o; Davis v. Munson,
43 Vt. 676, 1870; except when the laws of his state require
-him to make the arrest: .17fonroe Co. v. Bell, (Miss.) 18 So.
Rep. 121, 1895 ; and an arrest by an officer temporarily suspended: Smitlt v. Moore, i C. B. 438, 1845, will all entitle
the officer to the reward. So, a municipal officer who prosecutes an offender in another county: Bronnenberg v. Coburn,
1IO Ind. 169, 1886; and a fireman who rescues a body from
a burning building: Reif v. Paige, 55 Wis. 496, 1882, may
recover a reward offered for such services, since they are not
within the scope of their official duty.
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The Appellate Court of Indiana has recently held that the
duty of the porter of a sleeping-car to take charge of a
Sleeping.car passenger's baggage, and to assist in removing it
Companies,
from the car at its destination, being, under the
Liability for

rules of the particular company, within the scope
Baggage
of his employment, he is not to be regarded as a mere
gratuitous bailee; and, therefore, when the porter of a sleepingcar, in pursuance of his customary duties, took charge of a
passenger's baggage, for the purpose of removing it from the
car at the passenger's destination, and it was lost or stolen
through the negligence of the company's employes, the
company was liable therefor: Voss v. Wagner Palace Car
Co., 44 N. E. Rep. ioio, (on rehearing,) affirming 43 N. E.
Rep. 2o.
The Appellate Court of Indiana has lately ruled, that when
land was conveyed to one surety by absolute deed upon a parol
agreement for the security and protection of himself
Statute of
and his co-sureties, and the latter paid the debt of
Frauds,
Parol Trust,

Co-sureties,
Contribution

the principal, and the grantee sold the land and

refused to account, a bill by the co-sureties to

compel the grantee to account for their share of the indemnity
was not demurrable on the ground that it sought to establish
a parol trust in lands, which is void by Rev. Stat. Ind. 1894,
§ 3391 : Kelso v. Kelso, 44 N. E. Rep. 1013.
This decision might have equally well been rested upon the
broad principles of contribution, with which the statute was
certainly never intended to interfere.
Ardemus Stewart.

